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Abstract
This paper examines the questions of who participates in the provision of a public
good through the voluntary participation of agents in the presence of strong comple-
mentarity between a public good and a private good. We show that the greater the
initial endowment of the private good that agents have, the more likely they are to
participate in the provision of the public good. Whether an agent participates does
not depend on the eciency of his/her technology for production of the public good.
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1 Introduction
We examine the provision of a public good for the case in which there is strong com-
plementarity between the public good and a private good. An authentic example of our
problem is investment to improve the quality of Open Source Software (OSS), such as
Linux and Apache. Because OSS is usually provided free by developers of the software
on the web, it is available to everyone at the same quality at no cost. Thus, it can be
treated as a public good. OSS also has the nature of a complementary product for private
goods used by private agents. Improvement in the quality of Linux, for instance, bene-
ts the users of Linux-based computers. The relation between the qualities of Linux and
those of Linux-based computers/applications has the following important property. High-
quality computers/applications require Linux to be of similar quality. If the quality of
Linux is not sucient, such computers/applications do not achieve optimum performance.
In other words, the quality of Linux functions as the maximum performance capacity of
Linux-based computers/applications. That is, the users benet from high-quality Linux-
based computers/applications only if the quality of Linux is high.
In the presence of strong complementarity between public and private goods, as in
Linux and its applications, beneciaries of the public good are likely to participate volun-
tarily in provision of the public good. For an individual to obtain substantial utility, it is
necessary to consume large quantities of both public and private goods. Thus, when the
public good is provided in suciently low quantities, an individual voluntarily produces
the public good using private goods rather than by free riding. The complementarity
between the public and the private goods may result in the participation of many individ-
uals in providing public goods. In fact, there are many projects for OSS; many engineers
voluntarily participate in the development of OSS, and many types of high-quality OSS
are provided.1 This situation concerning OSS seems dierent from that predicted by the
1See Lerner and Tirole (2002) for information on the development of OSS.
2
standard theory of public goods, which states that the free-rider problem causes the un-
derprovision of a public good in comparison with the Pareto-ecient level of supply. In a
situation such as OSS development, the following questions arise. Who participates in the
public good provision? How is desirable allocation achieved by the many contributors?
To examine these questions, we construct the following theoretical model. There is
one public good and one private good. The private good is consumed by agents or is used
to provide the public good. Each agent has the technology and the resources (his/her
initial endowment of the private good) to provide the public good. The technology and
the resources for the public good may dier among agents. To capture the strong com-
plementarity between the private and public goods, all agents are assumed to have the
same Leontief utility function with respect to the consumption of the two goods. We
examine participation behavior using a voluntary participation game. The participation
game consists of two stages. In the rst stage, all agents simultaneously choose whether
to participate in the provision of a public good. In the second stage, knowing the other
agents' participation decisions, the agents who chose to participate simultaneously decide
their contribution to a public good, as in a voluntary contribution game (Bergstrom et
al., 1987).
We rst show that voluntary participation and contribution to the public good at the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the participation game depend solely on an agent's
initial endowment of the private good. The greater the initial endowment of the private
good that agents have, the more likely they are to participate and contribute to the public
good. Becoming a contributor does not depend on the eciency of their technology for
production of the public good: even if an agent has more ecient technology than others,
he/she may choose not to contribute. We emphasize that our paper partially supports
the recent interesting empirical results of Bitzer and Geishecker (2010), who investigate
the question of who actually creates OSS. Using a sample with both contributors and
noncontributors to OSS projects, they investigate the view that it is mainly workers with
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high educational attainment that voluntarily contribute to OSS development. They nd no
positive association whatsoever between formal education and the probability of voluntary
OSS contributions. They also nd that the length of work hours is highly statistically
signicant and has a negative impact on the probability of contributing voluntarily to
OSS projects. These two ndings are related to one of our results: the determinant of
contribution to the provision of a public good is not related to the eciency of agents'
contribution but to their initial endowments. Eciency in our model is related to high
educational attainment in their empirical analysis, and initial endowment in our model is
negatively related to the length of work hours in their analysis. Based on the similarity
between the results in their study and ours, we believe that our model has the potential
to explain why someone voluntarily contributes to OSS development.
Second, we examine the Pareto eciency of the equilibrium allocation in the voluntary
participation game. We introduce two criteria of feasibility of allocations, depending upon
whether the resource for providing the public good is transferable among agents. The
individually feasible allocation is dened such that for each agent, the initial endowment
of the private good covers consumption of the private good and contribution to the public
good. The socially feasible allocation is dened such that the aggregate initial endowment
of the private good in the economy covers the aggregate consumption of the private good
and the aggregate contribution to the public good. We show that while the equilibrium
allocation is Pareto ecient within the set of individually feasible allocations, it is not
necessarily so within the set of socially feasible allocations (we call this s-Pareto ecient).
We show that the allocation at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the voluntary
participation game is s-Pareto ecient if and only if only the agent with the most ecient
production technology is a contributor.
Third, we examine whether agents voluntarily redistribute the private good among
them so that the s-Pareto-ecient allocation is achieved. We extend the voluntary partic-
ipation game so that agents can transfer the private good, based on the model of Jackson
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and Wilkie (2005). We provide a sucient condition under which voluntary transfer re-
sults in s-Pareto eciency. The sucient condition implies that contributors expected to
produce positive amounts of the public good can improve their utility levels if they can
transfer their endowments among them. In the context of OSS, money is considered a
transferable resource among engineers. Time can also be such a resource, and is usually
nontransferable. There may be a case in which time is transferable through the division
of roles among a group of engineers.2 Note that the above sucient condition also implies
that the s-Pareto-ecient allocation is not necessarily achieved through voluntary transfer.
As an example, we examine the diculty of achieving s-Pareto-ecient allocation through
voluntary transfer.
Related literature
This paper is closely related to the analysis of the voluntary participation problem
in a public good mechanism. Saijo and Yamato (1999) introduce a voluntary participa-
tion game and analyze the number of agents voluntarily participating in the public good
mechanism when they can freely decide to do so. In Saijo and Yamato's (1999) model,
all agents are assumed to have the same Cobb{Douglas utility function.3 Healy (2010),
Furusawa and Konishi (2011), and Konishi and Shinohara (2012) investigate the voluntary
participation problem in other domains of utility functions. The main message of these
studies is that if participation in a public good mechanism is not coerced, every agent
has an incentive not to participate and to free ride the public good provided by partici-
pants. Thus, even if a mechanism is constructed to provide desirable allocations, such as
the Pareto-ecient allocation at its equilibrium, it is very dicult to provide all agents
with an incentive for voluntary participation. In contrast, Shinohara (2009, 2011) points
2We believe that transfers would also be easy in the following situation. Several agents in a group
must perform some duties in cooperation. That is, each agent needs to spend some time performing these
duties, spending his/her remaining time consuming the private good or producing the public good. In this
context, an agent's initial remaining time is related to the initial endowment. A transfer of one agent's
duty to another changes their remaining time.
3Saijo and Yamato (2010) extend their analysis to the cases in which agents have dierent Cobb{Douglas
utility functions or a quasilinear utility function.
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out that if there is a specic structure for a public good, the Pareto- ecient provision
is possible at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the voluntary participation game.
None of these studies has examined how strong complementarity between the private and
public goods aects the incentive for agents to participate.
This paper also contributes to the literature on OSS. Academic scholars have investi-
gated the hows and whys of OSS development (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Johnson, 2002;
Franke and von Hippel, 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh,
2003; Bitzer and Schroder, 2005; Bitzer et al., 2007). In the existing literature, while
many empirical analyses have been conducted, there are only a few theoretical investiga-
tions using models of public good provision. Johnson (2002) investigates why developers
voluntarily provide OSS and how the voluntary development of OSS aects social welfare.
Basically, in his model, whether a developer voluntarily contributes to an OSS depends
on the relationship between the cost and benet of development. Unlike us, he does not
explicitly model the strong complementarity between the private and public good, which
can be observed in many types of OSS. The results are quite dierent in the sense that
while Johnson (2002) explains the incentive for voluntary development according to the
benet from the OSS and its development cost, we explain incentive by the amount of
resources held by a developer for developing an OSS.4 In this sense, our result is unique.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis of the model. Section 4 investigates the welfare
property of the model and extends the basic model. Section 5 compares our result with
that of Saijo and Yamato (1999). Section 6 concludes.
4Myatt and Wallace (2002) and Bitzer and Schroder (2005) also examine the voluntary development
of OSS, from a theoretical viewpoint. They explain the incentive for voluntary development of an OSS in
terms of the relationship between the benet and the development cost.
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2 Preliminaries
Consider an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Let
N = f1; : : : ; ng be a set of agents, with n  2. Every agent has a preference relation that
may be represented by a Leontief utility function. Let Ui(Y; xi) = minfY; xig be a utility
function of i 2 N , in which Y represents the supply of the public good and xi is the private
good consumption of i 2 N . Every agent i 2 N has an initial endowment of wi > 0 of the
private good, but none of the public good. The public good is produced from the private
good. Suppose that i 2 N pays pi units of the private good to produce one unit of the
public good: pi > 0 is the \price" of the public good. The lower pi is, the more ecient
agent i. Without loss of generality, we assume that p1      pn. Let yi 2 R+ be a
supply level of the public good produced by i 2 N . Then the budget balance condition
of i 2 N is xi + piyi = wi.5 Let (y1: : : : ; yn) 2 Rn+ be the prole of contributions to the
public good. The quantity of the public good produced in the economy is Y =
P
j2N yj .
We consider a situation in which there exists an opportunity for joint production of the
public good, and each agent can decide whether to participate in production. We consider
the following two-stage game. In the rst stage, agents simultaneously decide whether
to participate in providing the public good (participation stage). In the second stage, all
agents know the others' participation decisions, and simultaneously decide the quantity
of the public good to produce. The nonparticipants can free ride the public good. The
formal denition of the game is as follows.
Stage 1. Every agent i 2 N chooses whether to participate, simultaneously with the
others.
Stage 2. Let P  N be a set of participants. Each i 2 P decides the contribution yi;P 2
R+, simultaneously with others. The level of the public good provided by the participants
is YP =
P
j2P yj;P . The payo to i 2 P is Ui(YP ; wi piyi;P ) = minfYP ; wi piyi;P g. The
5Note that we impose no condition on the order of (wi)i2N .
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payo to i 2 NnP is Ui(YP ; wi) = minfYP ; wig.
The two-stage public good provision game is known as the (voluntary) participation
game, introduced by Saijo and Yamato (1999).
3 A voluntary participation game: Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Nash equilibria in the second-stage game
We analyze the voluntary participation game by backward induction. We rst solve the
second-stage game. Let P  N be a set of participants. Let yi;P : R+ ! R+ be a best
response function of i 2 P such that Pj2Pnfig yj;P 2 R+ 7! yi;P (Pj2Pnfig yj;P ) 2 R+.
Then
yi;P
 X
j2Pnfig
yj;P

=
8><>:
wi  
P
j2Pnfig yj;P
1 + pi
if wi >
X
j2Pnfig
yj;P
0 otherwise
: (1)
By the denition of the (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium, yP  (yi;P )i2P 2 R#P+ is a
Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game when P is a set of participants if and only if
yi;P = y

i;P (
P
j2Pnfig y

j;P ) for each i 2 P . In the voluntary contribution game, a Nash
equilibrium is not necessarily an interior solution. Let C(P; yP )  fj 2 N jyj;P > 0g: the
set of contributors, participants contributing to the public good, at yP .
Lemma 1 Let P  N be a set of participants. Let yP be a Nash equilibrium of the
voluntary contribution game. (i) Set C(P; yP ) is not empty.
(ii) For each i 2 P
yi;P =
8<:
1
pi(1+
P
j2C(P;y
P
)(1=pj))

wi + wi
P
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
 Pj2C(P;yP ) wjpj  if i 2 C(P; yP )
0 otherwise
:
(iii)
X
j2P
yj;P =
P
j2C(P;yP )(wj=pj)
1 +
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj)
:
(iv) For each i 2 P , yi;P > 0 if and only if wi >
X
j2P
yj;P .
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Proof. Suppose that C(P; yP ) = ;. For each i 2 P , if yj;P = 0 for each j 2 Pnfig,
then i 2 P is made better o by providing wi=(1 + pi) units of the public good, which
contradicts that yP is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that
P
j2P y

j;P =
P
j2C(P;yP ) y

j;P and wj 
P
j2C(P;yP ) y

j;P for each j =2 C(P; yP ).
By (1)
yi;P =
wi  
P
j2C(P;yP )nfig yj;P
1 + pi
or yi;P =
wi  
P
j2C(P;yP ) yj;P
1 + pi
+
yi;P
1 + pi
for each i 2 C(P; yP ). Thus
yi;P =
wi
pi
  1
pi
X
j2C(P;yP )
yj;P (2)
for each i 2 C(P; yP ). Summarizing these conditions over i 2 C(P; yP ) yieldsX
j2C(P;yP )
yj;P =
X
j2C(P;yP )
wj
pj
 
X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
X
j2C(P;yP )
yj;P :
Then X
j2C(P;yP )
yj;P =
P
j2C(P;yP )(wj=pj)
1 +
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj)
(3)
Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain
yi;P =
1
pi(1 +
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj))
0@wi + wi X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
 
X
j2C(P;yP )
wj
pj
1A (4)
for each i 2 C(P; yP ). By (4)
yi;P =
1
pi(1 +
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj))
0@wi
0@1 + X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
1A  X
j2C(P;yP )
wj
pj
1A ;
which shows (iv). 
Lemma 2 Let P  N be a set of participants. Suppose that w = wi for each i 2 P .
Then X
j2C(P;yP )
yj;N =
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj)
1 +
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj)
w < w; (5)
which implies that C(P; yP ) = P .
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Proof. It is immediately seen from (3) that (5) holds. By (5) and (iv) in Lemma 1,
C(P; yP ) = P . 
A Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contribution game when P  N is a set of
participants is not necessarily an interior solution; every agent in P contributes a positive
amount of a public good at a Nash equilibrium. Whereas the Nash equilibrium for this
game is interior if every participant has the same initial endowment of the private good,
as Lemma 2 shows, it is not necessarily interior otherwise. We must note a possible case in
which an ecient agent makes a smaller contribution than an inecient agent, depending
on the distribution of the initial endowments of the private good, as Example 1 shows.
Example 1 Let n = 2, with w1 < w2 and p1 < p2. If (1 + p2)w1   w2 > 0
y1 =
(1 + p2)w1   w2
p1 + p2 + p1p2
and y2 =
(1 + p1)w2   w1
p1 + p2 + p1p2
; (6)
otherwise
y1 = 0 and y

2 =
w2
1 + p2
:
When a Nash equilibrium is interior, by (6), we have
y1   y2 =
(2 + p2)w1   (2 + p1)w2
p1 + p2 + p1p2
:
This is negative if and only if w2 > (2 + p2)w1=(2 + p1) (> w1). There is a possibility
that the ecient provider, agent 1, provides fewer public goods than the other agents,
regardless of whether the Nash equilibrium is interior. 
From (4), we nd that whether an agent becomes a contributor depends on the amount
of the initial endowment of the private good. The rst fraction in (4) is always positive
because pi > 0 for any i. The sign of y

i;P is, therefore, the same as that of the value
between the parentheses, which is increasing in wi. This means that if agent i with wi
provides a positive amount of the public good, so does agent k with wk(> wi).
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Proposition 1 For each P  N and each pair i; k 2 P , if yi;P > 0 and wk  wi, then
yk;P > 0.
Proof. If the value between the parentheses of yk;P is larger than that of y

i;P , y

k;P > 0.
The dierence between the values is given as0@wk + wk X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
 
X
j2C(P;yP )
wj
pj
1A 
0@wi + wi X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
 
X
j2C(P;yP )
wj
pj
1A
= (wk   wi)
0@1 + wk X
j2C(P;yP )
1
pj
1A :
The last equation is nonnegative when wk  wi. The proposition holds. 
The value between the parentheses in (4) reects the decision of agent i on whether to
contribute. The rst fraction in (4) reects the signicance of the contribution from agent
i. As the value of pi decreases, the rst fraction in (4) increases.
3.2 Who participates? Equilibrium analysis of the rst stage
We examine the rst-stage game induced by yP in Lemma 1 for each P  N .
We rst provide basic properties of the set of contributors and the level of the public
good in Lemmas 3, 4, and 5. Lemma 3 shows that the level of the public good is the same
in the case in which the entire P  N is a set of participants and the case in which its
set of contributors C(P; yP ) is itself a set of participants: the noncontributors in P never
aect the decision of the contributors.
Lemma 3 For each P  N , Pj2P yj;P =Pj2C(P;yP ) yj;C(P;yP ).
Proof. By Lemma 1, for each i 2 C(P; yP ), yi;P depends on
P
j2C(P;yP )(1=pj) andP
j2C(P;yP )(wj=pj). These values do not change if C(P; y

P ) is a set of participants. Thus,
yi;P = y

i;C(P;yP )
for each i 2 C(P; yP ). 
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Lemmas 4 and 5 show how the set of contributors and the level of the public good
change if the set of participants is expanded. Lemma 4 examines the eect of the expansion
by agent i such that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P (inuential agent), while Lemma 5 examines the
eects by agent i such that wi 
P
j2P y

j;P (noninuential agent).
Lemma 4 Let P ( N and let i 2 NnP . Suppose that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P . Then
(4.1) i 2 C(P [ fig; yP[fig),
(4.2)
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig >
P
j2P y

j;P , and
(4.3) C(P [ fig; yP[fig) = C(P [ fig; yP[fig) \ C(P; yP ) [ fig.
The proof is in the appendix. Agent i such that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P is inuential on P
in the sense that i becomes a contributor and his/her participation increases the level
of the public good as (4.1) and (4.2) show. By (4.3), the noncontributors before the
participation of such an agent never become contributors after this participation: no
agents in PnC(P; yP ) change their behavior as a result of this participation.
Lemma 5 For each P ( N and each i 2 NnP , if wi 
P
j2P y

j;P , then i =2 C(P [
fig; yP[fig) and C(P [ fig; yP[fig) = C(P; yP ).
The proof is in the appendix. By Lemma 5, no agent i such that wi 
P
j2P y

j;P changes
the set of contributors and the level of the public good even if he/she participates in P .
Proposition 2 presents a condition under which each agent participates in public good
provision.
Proposition 2 For each P ( N and each i 2 NnP , if wi >
P
j2P y

j;P , then i is made
better o by joining P . Otherwise, i is indierent between participation and nonpartici-
pation.
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Proof. By (4.1) and (4.2) of Lemma 4, wi >
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig >
P
j2P y

j;P for each
i 2 NnP such that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P . If such an agent i chooses to participate, his/her payo
is
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig and if he/she chooses not to participate, his/her payo is
P
j2P y

j;P .
By Lemma 5, i =2 C(P [ fig; yP[fig) and
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig =
P
j2P y

j;P for each
i 2 NnP such that wi 
P
j2P y

j;P . Thus, his/her payo is wi, regardless of whether
he/she participates. 
Let P ( N . Let i =2 P be such that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P and let k =2 P be such that
wk 
P
j2P y

j;P . By Proposition 2 and (4.1) of Lemma 4, whereas i is willing to participate
and make a contribution, k is indierent between participating and not participating.
Because i has a Leontief preference, he/she may be better o by increasing the level of
the public good. If i participates in P , he/she can contribute an adequate amount of
the private good in a way that increases the public good provision ((4.2) of Lemma 4).
Although k has the same preference, he/she cannot increase his/her payo any further. If k
participates and contributes a positive amount, k is made worse o. Even if k participates,
he/she makes no contribution; thus, participating and not participating are equivalent for
k.
By the denition of a Nash equilibrium, P  N is a set of participants supported at a
Nash equilibrium if and only if (i) Ui(
P
j2P y

j;P ; wi   piyj;P )  Ui(
P
j2Pnfig y

i;Pnfig; wi  
piy

i;Pnfig) for each i 2 P and (ii) Ui(
P
j2P y

j;P ; wi)  Ui(
P
j2P[fig y

i;P[fig; wi piyi;P[fig)
for each i 2 NnP . Condition (i) means that no participant can be made better o by
deviating to nonparticipation and (ii) means that no nonparticipant can be made better
o by joining P . When agents have a Leontief preference, these conditions are equivalent
to (i') and (ii') in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For each P  N , P is a Nash equilibrium set of participants if and only
if (i') wi >
P
j2Pnfig y

j;Pnfig for each i 2 C(P; yP ) and (ii') wi 
P
j2P y

j;P for each
i 2 NnP .
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Proof. (suciency) By Proposition 2, no i 2 C(P; yP ) and j 2 NnP have an incentive
to change participation decisions. For each k 2 PnC(P; yP ), yk;P = 0; hence, wk P
j2P y

j;P . Because C(P; y

P ) = C(Pnfkg; yPnfkg), then
P
j2P y

j;P =
P
j2Pnfkg y

j;Pnfkg.
Thus, k obtains a payo wk irrespective of his/her participation decision.
(necessity) Suppose that there is i 2 C(P; yP ) such that wi 
P
j2Pnfig y

j;Pnfig. Be-
cause i 2 C(P; yP ) implies that
P
j2P y

j;P < wi, then
P
j2P y

j;P < wi 
P
j2Pnfig y

j;Pnfig.
Thus, i's payo if he/she participates,
P
j2P y

j;P , is less than that if he/she does not par-
ticipate, wi. In conclusion, i is better o switching from participation to nonparticipation,
a contradiction. By Proposition 2, if there is i 2 NnP such that wi >
P
j2P y

j;P , then i
is better o participating, which is a contradiction. Thus, (i') and (ii') hold. 
By Proposition 3, to check whether P is a Nash equilibrium set of participants, it is
sucient to check whether P  N satises (i') and (ii') in the proposition. By Propositions
2 and 3, if P  N is a Nash equilibrium set of participants, then every agent outside P
is indierent between participating and not participating. Because of this indierence, a
Nash equilibrium set of participants may not be unique. Proposition 4 identies all sets
of participants that are supported at a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 For each P  N , P is a Nash equilibrium set of participants if and only
if C(N; yN )  P  N .
The proof is in the appendix. In the voluntary participation game, there are generally
#fP jC(N; yN )  P  Ng subgame-perfect Nash equilibria because the second-stage game
has the unique Nash equilibrium for each (nonempty) set of participants. However, each
agent in NnC(N; yN ) is indierent between participating and not participating and he/she
contributes nothing at the equilibria even if he/she participates. Thus, the allocation
supported at subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is unique.
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4 Welfare analysis
We discuss the welfare properties of the allocations attained at the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria of the voluntary participation game. Some of the initial endowments are trans-
ferable among agents and others are not. For example, money, which is a resource for
development of OSS, is an example of transferable resources. We investigate whether the
equilibrium allocation is Pareto ecient in both cases.
We rst consider the case of nontransferable endowments. Denition 1 provides con-
cepts of the feasible allocation and the Pareto eciency in the economy in which agents
cannot transfer the private good to each other.
Denition 1 (i) An allocation (Y; (yi; xi)i2N ) is individually feasible if wi  piyi + xi for
each i 2 N and Y =Pi2N yi. (ii) An allocation (Y; (yi; xi)i2N ) is Pareto ecient within
the set of individually feasible allocations|henceforth, i-Pareto ecient for short|if there
is no individually feasible allocation (Y 0; (y0i; x
0
i)i2N ) such that Ui(Y
0; x0i)  Ui(Y; xi) for
all i 2 N with strict inequality for at least one i 2 N .
Proposition 5 The allocation at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the voluntary
participation game is i-Pareto ecient.
Proof. At the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, the payo of agent i is
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;N
if i 2 C(N; yN ) and wi if i 2 NnC(N; yN ). First, no i 2 NnC(N; yN ) is made better o
by the switch of allocations. By (iv) of Lemma 1, wi 
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;N . To increase the
payo to i 2 NnC(N; yN ), it is necessary that i's consumption of the private good increases
beyond wi. However, the consumption of the private good is at most wi within the set of
individually feasible allocations. Second, we show that if k 2 C(N; yN ) is made better o,
then the other agent is made worse o. For k 2 C(N; yN ),
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;N = wk pkyk;N ,
where the right-hand side is k's consumption of the private good. Because k has a Leontief
utility function, to improve his/her payo, it is necessary to reduce his/her contribution of
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the public good, which induces an increase in the private good consumption of k, and other
agents increase their contribution of the public good more than the reduction. However,
the change of contribution of the others decreases their payos. In summary, no Pareto
improvement is possible. 
The welfare property of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is related to the result
of Kukushkin (1992). Using an abstract one-shot game, he characterizes a condition
for utility functions under which there is a Nash equilibrium with Pareto eciency. The
Leontief utility functions satisfy his condition. However, he does not clarify the equilibrium
behavior (contribution and participation) of agents because his model is abstract and
does not examine a concrete model of a public good economy. Unlike the ndings of
Kukushkin (1992), our result shows the behavior of each agent. For example, Proposition
1 shows that the participation decision of the agent depends solely on his/her initial
endowment of the private good; Proposition 5, together with Proposition 4, shows that
the partial participation of agents, not necessarily that of all agents, achieves the i-Pareto-
ecient allocation at the equilibrium of the voluntary participation game. In Saijo and
Yamato's (1999, 2010) model, the i-Pareto-ecient allocation is achieved only if all agents
participate.
We next consider the case of transferable endowments. Denition 2 describes feasibility
and Pareto eciency when agents can transfer their endowments to others.
Denition 2 (i) An allocation (Y; (yi; xi)i2N ) is socially feasible if
P
i2N wi 
P
i2N (piyi + xi)
and Y =
P
i2N yi. (ii) An allocation (Y; (yi; xi)i2N ) is Pareto ecient within the set of
socially feasible allocations|henceforth, s-Pareto ecient for short|if there is no socially
feasible allocation (Y 0; (y0i; x
0
i)i2N ) such that Ui(Y
0; x0i)  Ui(Y; xi) for all i 2 N with strict
inequality for at least one i 2 N .
We exemplify that the allocation at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the voluntary
participation game is not necessarily s-Pareto ecient.
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Example 1' Let n = 2, with w1 < w2 and p1 < p2. Without transfers, by (6)
y1 =
(1 + p2)w1   w2
p1 + p2 + p1p2
; y2 =
(1 + p1)w2   w1
p1 + p2 + p1p2
; and
X
i2N
yi =
p1w2 + p2w1
p1 + p2 + p1p2
; (7)
if (1 + p2)w1   w2  0 and (1 + p1)w2   w1  0. We assume that the two equalities hold.
When agent 2 transfers his/her endowment of the private good by t 2 [0; w2] to agent 1,
their ex post endowments of the private good are w01 = w1 + t and w02 = w2   t. The ex
post level of the public good is
p1w2 + p2w1 + (p2   p1)t
p1 + p2 + p1p2
;
if (1 + p2)w
0
1  w02  0 and (1 + p1)w02  w01  0. For t 2 [0; w2], only the latter inequality
can be binding. This is rewritten as
(1 + p1)w
0
2   w01 = (1 + p1)w2   w1   (2 + p1)t  0 or t 
(1 + p1)w2   w1
2 + p1
:
For t satisfying the inequality, the ex post level of the public good is increasing in t. The
maximum level of the public good is (w1 +w2)=(2 + p1), which is equivalent to the utility
levels of the two agents. Because
P
j2N y

j < (w1 + w2)=(2 + p1), the allocation attained
by the transfer Pareto-dominates the allocation with (7).
The s-Pareto eciency of the ex post allocation through the transfer can be easily
checked by Proposition 6 below. 
Proposition 6 provides a necessary and sucient condition under which the volun-
tary participation game has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium that achieves s-Pareto
eciency.
Proposition 6 Suppose that p1 < pj for each j 2 Nnf1g. Let (Y ; (yi ; xi )i2N ) be a
socially feasible allocation supported at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the volun-
tary participation game. Then, (Y ; (yi ; x

i )i2N ) is s-Pareto ecient if and only if agent 1
is the only contributor.
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Proof. (suciency) At the equilibrium, x1 = w1  p1y1 = y1 and xj = wj  y1 for each
j 2 Nnf1g. Under these conditions, to increase the payo of agent 1, it is necessary to
increase both agent 1's consumption of the private good and the level of the public good
using the others' initial endowments of the private good. However, these other agents are
made worse o because their consumption of the private good decreases.
(necessity) Suppose, to the contrary, that agent 1 is not the only contributor, which implies
that there is j 2 Nnf1g that is a contributor, yj > 0. Consider the following allocation
(Y 0; (y0i; x
0
i)i2N ) such that Y
0 =
P
i2N y
0
i and for all k 2 N
x0k =
8<:x1 +
pj   p1
2
yj if k = 1
xk otherwise
and y0k =
8>><>>:
y1 + yj +
pj   p1
2p1
yj if k = 1
0 if k = j
yk otherwise
: (8)
Because
P
i2f1;jg(x
0
i + piy
0
i) =
P
i2f1;jg(x

i + piy

i ), this allocation is socially feasible. Be-
cause Y 0 > Y  and x01 > x1, agent 1 is made better o by switching from (Y ; (yi ; x

i )i2N )
to (Y 0; (y0i; x
0
i)i2N ). Note that by this switch, the amount of the public good increases and
the consumption of the private good of agent k is the same for each k 2 Nnf1g. Thus, no
agent k 2 Nnf1g is made worse o by the switch. This is a contradiction. 
In the voluntary participation game, the endowment transfer between agents is not
allowed. Thus, even if an agent has an ecient technology (a low price), if he/she does
not have enough endowments of the private good, then he/she may not be a contributor.
There is a possibility that an ecient technology is not used to provide a public good
because of the lack of initial endowments. This possibility becomes a source of allocative
ineciency.
By Proposition 6, the following question naturally comes to mind: is the s-Pareto-
ecient allocation achieved as an equilibrium of a game in which agents can freely transfer
their endowments to each other? We extend a voluntary participation game by allowing
the transfer of endowments among agents according to the endogenous-game approach
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of Jackson and Wilkie (2005) and examine cases in which s-Pareto-ecient allocation is
achieved through the transfer. A voluntary participation game with side payments is a
game in which there is a side payment stage among agents prior to the voluntary partici-
pation game. The formal statement of the game is as follows.
Denition 3 (A voluntary participation game with side payments) Let wi  0
be an initial endowment of the private good of agent i 2 N . In the voluntary participation
game with side payments, each i 2 N rst simultaneously chooses ti  (tij)j2N 2 Rn+
such that tii = 0 and
P
j2N tij  wi, where tij  0 represents the amount of the private
good transferred from i 2 N to j 2 N . At the end of this stage, each i 2 N has
w0i  wi+
P
j2Nnfig (tji   tij). The second and third stages are equivalent to the voluntary
participation game when each i 2 N has w0i units of the private good at the start of the
participation decision.
We establish a sucient condition under which the voluntary transfer of the private
good among agents achieves the s-Pareto-ecient allocation in a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the voluntary participation game with side payments.
Proposition 7 An s-Pareto-ecient allocation can be achieved at a subgame- perfect
Nash equilibrium of the voluntary participation game with side payments if
(n+ p1)wi >
X
j2N
wj >
n+ p1
1 + p2
wi for each i 2 Nnf1g. (9)
Proof. Let (Y e; (yej ; x
e
j)j2N ) be a feasible allocation such that
ye1 =
P
j2N wj
n+ p1
; yej = 0 for each j 2 Nnf1g; Y e = ye1;
and xej = Y
e for all j 2 N .
Let (teji)j;i2N be a transfer scheme such that
teji =
(
wj   xej = wj   ye1 if j 6= 1 and i = 1
0 if j 6= 1 and i 6= 1 or j = 1 :
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Given (teji)j;i2N , each i 2 N has wei = (1 + p1)ye1 of the private good if i = 1 and wei = ye1
otherwise at the beginning of the second-stage game and (Y e; (yej ; x
e
j)j2N ) is attained at
the equilibrium outcome of the second and third stages. By Proposition 6, because agent
1 is the only contributor at (Y e; (yej ; x
e
j)j2N ), it is s-Pareto ecient.
We show that the transfer scheme is feasible, which means that tej1 > 0 for each
j 2 Nnf1g, and it is supported at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the voluntary
participation game with side payments. Clearly, for each i 2 Nnf1g, tej1 > 0 if and only if
wi  
P
j2N wj
n+ p1
=
1
n+ p1
0@(n+ p1)wi  X
j2N
wj
1A > 0: (10)
We prove that no agent has an incentive to reduce their amount of transfer given the
transfers of the other agents. Now suppose that some agent j 2 Nnf1g reduces the level of
transfer tej1 by zj and allocates zj to the other n  1 agents including agent j. Let (t0ji)i2N
be such a transfer scheme of j: t0j1 = t
e
j1   zj ,
P
i2Nnf1g t
0
ji = zj , and t
0
ji  0.6 Because j
has a Leontief utility function, j's payo when j deviates is at most the (aggregate) level
of the public good. We rst identify the ceiling of j's payo by deviating, and second prove
that the ceiling of j's payo is no greater than ye1, which is j's payo before deviation.
The deviation by j may change the set of contributors C(N; yN ). Let Q be the changed
contributor set. By Lemma 1, for this changed set, the sum of the public good
P
j2Q y

j;Q
is given as X
i2Q
yi;Q =
P
i2Q(w
0
i=pi)
1 +
P
i2Q(1=pi)
;
where w01 = we1  zj and w0i = wei + t0ji for each i 2 Nnf1g. Note that if agent i 2 Nnf1; jg
with t0ji > 0 does not contribute, agent j can increase the level of the public good by
ceasing to transfer t0ji to i and using it for provision of the public good. Thus, there is
room to increase the amount of the public good (or the ceiling of j's payo by deviating).
Therefore, every i 2 Nnf1; jg such that t0ji > 0 must be a contributor: i 2 Q.
6By the formal denition of the transfer, t0jj = 0. However, by this proof, we interpret that t
0
jj =
zj  Pi2Nnf1;jg tji for notational brevity. Of course, t0jj  0 in this notation.
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First, suppose that agent 1 contributes. The sum of the public good is
X
k2Q
yk;Q =
(1 + p1)y
e
1  
P
k2Qnf1g t
0
jk
p1
+
X
k2Qnf1g
ye1 + t
0
jk
pk
1 +
P
k2Q(1=pk)
= ye1 +
X
k2Qnf1g

1
pk
  1
p1

t0jk
1 +
P
k2Q(1=pk)
 ye1
because 1=pk 1=p1 = (p1 pk)=(p1pk)  0. Thus, j cannot be made better o by changing
to t0j .
Second, suppose that agent 1 does not contribute. The level of the public good is
X
k2Q
yk;Q =
X
k2Q
ye1 + t
0
jk
pk
1 +
P
k2Q(1=pk)
:
Suppose that agent l has the lowest price among members of Q: pl = mini2Q pi. Allocating
some of t0jk such that k 2 Nnf1; j; lg to agent l increases the level of the public good. By
gradually reducing the value of t0jk and allocating it to agent l, either agent k does not
contribute or the value of t0jk becomes zero. In the former situation, for the same reason
above, agent j receives the rest of it and expends it to make the public and private goods.
Therefore, t0jk = 0 for each k 2 Nnf1; j; lg. After the procedure, agent j allocates all of
zj to agent l. In this situation, there are two possibilities: (1) only agent l contributes, or
(2) all agents except 1 contribute.
Case (1). Given the reduction, if only agent l contributes, the level of the public good
is
yl;flg =
(ye1 + zj)=pl
1 + 1=pl
=
ye1 + zj
1 + pl
:
This is smaller than ye1 if and only if zj < ply
e
1. Note that zj must satisfy zj  wj   ye1
because tj1 = wj   ye1. If plye1 is larger than wj   ye1, yl is smaller than ye1. The condition
is
ply
e
1   (wj   ye1) > 0 or ye1 >
wj
1 + pl
:
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Case (2). Given the reduction, if all agents except agent 1 contribute, the total amount
of the public good is: X
k2N
yk;Q =
ye1
P
k2Nnf1g 1=pk + zj=pl
1 +
P
k2Nnf1g 1=pk
:
This is smaller than ye1 if and only if zj < ply
e
1. This inequality is the same as that in the
rst case.
P
k2N yk;N is smaller than y
e
1 if and only if y
e
1 > wj=(1 + pl):
From the discussion, we nd that no agent j 2 Nnf1g has an incentive to reduce its
transfer if and only if
ye1 >
wj
1 + pl
or
X
j2N
wj >
n+ p1
1 + pl
wj ;
which is satised by (9) because p2 is the second- lowest value among (pi)i2N . Trivially,
if j 2 Nnf1g increases transfer to agent 1 from tej1, then j's payo decreases. 
Condition (9) shows that if the sum of the initial endowments of the private good is
neither \too large" nor \too small," then the voluntary transfer of the private good can
achieve the s-Pareto-ecient allocation. As we can see in (10), the upper bound of the
sum of the initial endowments of the private good guarantees that endowment transfer in
the proof is feasible. Without this condition, there is no agent except 1 that can transfer
sucient of the private good, so that agent 1 is the only contributor and the s-Pareto-
ecient allocation is achieved. The lower bound of the sum of the initial endowments of
the private good prevents agents except agent 1 from deviating from the transfer scheme
transfer constructed in the proof. In particular, it plays an important role where an agent
transfers a large amount of the private good to agent 1. When such an agent ceases
the transfer to agent 1 and reallocates the goods, the set of contributors may change
drastically, which may in turn aect the supply of the public good. This case corresponds
to Cases (1) and (2) in the proof. In these cases, agent 1 ceases to contribute because
agent j deviates and ceases transferring the private good. Without this condition, the
supply of the public good may be increased following deviation, which implies that the
deviant is made better o by reducing the transfer to agent 1.
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Although condition (9) may appear to be restrictive, we must note the following as-
pects. First, some restriction for the initial distribution of the private good is needed for
the Pareto- improving transfer scheme to be supported at a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium. If there is coercion to execute the transfer scheme, then it would be easier to obtain
the s-Pareto-ecient allocation through the transfer. In fact, as in the proof of Propo-
sition 6, it is possible to Pareto improve the outcome supported at the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium by transfer schemes. However, when there is no outside authority to
compel the transfer scheme and agents can freely transfer the initial endowments of the
private good, it is a problem whether agents will voluntarily execute the Pareto-improving
transfer scheme. The following example shows that if condition (9) is violated, the Pareto-
improving transfer scheme cannot be executed without coercion.
Example 2 Consider the case in which n = 2, p1 < p2, and (1+p2)w1 < w2. In this case,
without transfers, (Y ; (yi ; x

i )i2N ) is attained at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
Y  =
X
i2N
yi ; y

1 = 0; y

2 =
w2
1 + p2
; x1 = w1; and x

2 =
w2
1 + p2
:
While the payo to agent 2 is Y , that to agent 1 is w1, which is smaller than Y . To
achieve the s-Pareto-ecient allocation through the transfer, by Proposition 6 agent 2 must
transfer in such a way that agent 1 is the only contributor. Agent 1 is the only contributor
if and only if the transfer from agent 2 to agent 1 is at least ((1+p1)w2 w1)=(2+p1) > 0.7
Within the range of the transfer, the maximum payo to agent 2 is (w1+w2)=(2+p1), which
can be obtained when he/she sets t21 = ((1 + p1)w2  w1)=(2 + p1). If (w1 +w2)=(2 + p1)
is smaller than Y , he/she does not transfer t21: he/she does not transfer if
w1 + w2
2 + p1
<
w2
1 + p2
or w1 <
1 + p1   p2
1 + p2
w2:
7The ex post endowment of the private good of agent 1 is w01 = w1 + t21 and that of agent 2 is
w02 = w2   t21. Agent 1 is the only contributor after the transfer only if w02  w01=(1 + p1). That is,
t21  ((1 + p1)w2   w1)=(2 + p1). Note also that w2 > (1 + p2)w1 implies (1 + p1)w2 > w1.
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Note that the conditions p1 < p2, and (1 + p2)w1 < w2, w1 < (1 + p1   p2)w2=(1 +
p2) are compatible; for example, (p1; p2; w1; w2) = (0:1; 1; 0:5; 20) satises all conditions.
Therefore, under the conditions, it is impossible to attain the s-Pareto-ecient allocation
even if agents can freely transfer the private good to each other. Furthermore, note that the
parameter values do not satisfy (9). However, Pareto improvement from (Y ; (yi ; x

i )i2N )
is possible because we can nd an allocation that Pareto dominates (Y ; (yi ; x

i )i2N ) by
applying (8). Such a Pareto improvement can successfully be executed if there is coercion
to do so.
Second, (9) includes interesting cases. The rst case is that every agent has the same
initial endowment of the private good. In this case, the voluntary endowment transfer of
the private good achieves a Pareto-ecient allocation because (9) holds in this situation.
Corollary 1 Suppose that wi = w > 0 for each i 2 N . An s-Pareto-ecient allocation
can be achieved at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the voluntary participation
game with side payments.
The second case is more general than the rst. This is a case in which every agent is a
contributor (without transfers). We can show that (9) implies that every agent contributes
to a positive level of the public good. From equation (4), we have the condition under
which every agent contributes to a positive amount of a public good
yi;N = wi + wi
X
h2N
1
ph
 
X
h2N
wh
ph
=
0@1 + X
h2Nnfig
1
ph
1Awi   X
h2Nnfig
wh
ph
> 0 for any i:
By Proposition 1, if yj;N > 0 such that j 2 argmink2N wk, then yi;N > 0 for each
i 2 Nnfjg. Dierentiating yj;N with respect to pi (i 6= 1), we have (wi   wj)=p2i . This is
nonnegative because wj has the lowest value among wk. This means that y

j;N does not
increase even if we replace pi by p1. For all pi such that i 6= 1, we replace pi by p1 and
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then the condition becomes
yj;N 

1 +
n  1
p1

wj  
X
h2Nnfjg
wh
p1
=
1
p1
 
(n+ p1)wj  
X
h2N
wh
!
> 0:
This is equivalent to the left-hand side of (9) in Proposition 7.
5 Discussion
One may conjecture that the strong complementarity between the private and public good
strengthens the incentive for voluntary contribution to the public good. We discuss how
strong complementarity aects the incentive to contribute voluntarily to the public good
by comparing our results with those of Saijo and Yamato (1999, 2010).
We introduce the notion of group eciency by naturally extending the i-Pareto e-
ciency in Denition 1: let P  N be a set of participants. (i) An allocation (Y; (yi; xi)i2P )
is individually feasible for P if wi  piyi + xi for each i 2 P and Y =
P
i2P yi. (ii) An
allocation for P , (Y; (yi; xi)i2P ), is group ecient within the set of individually feasible
allocations for P|henceforth, i-group ecient for P for short|if there is no individually
feasible allocation for P , (Y 0; (y0i; x
0
i)i2P ), such that Ui(Y
0; x0i)  Ui(Y; xi) for all i 2 P
with strict inequality for at least one i 2 P . For each set of participants, the second stage
of the voluntary participation game achieves i-group eciency at a Nash equilibrium if
every agent has the same Leontief utility function.
Proposition 8 Suppose that every agent has the same Leontief utility function. For each
P  N , the voluntary contribution game when P is the set of agents achieves i-group-
ecient allocation for P at a Nash equilibrium.
We can illustrate Proposition 8 in a similar way to Proposition 5. At the Nash
equilibrium of the voluntary contribution game,
P
j2C(P;yP ) y

j;P = wi   piyi;P for each
i 2 C(P; yP ) and
P
j2C(P;yP ) y

j;P  wi for each i 2 PnC(P; yP ). No i 2 PnC(P; yP ) can
be made better o because wi is the maximum payo that i can obtain. For i 2 C(P; yP )
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to be made better o, other agents j 2 Pnfig must increase their contribution to the
public good, which reduces j's payo.
Saijo and Yamato (1999, 2010) study the participation problem in the voluntary con-
tribution game. They use the same model as we do, except for agents' utility functions.
In their model, agents have the Cobb{Douglas utility function and quasilinear function,
which have weaker complementarity between the private and the public goods than the
Leontief utility function. In their case, the equilibrium allocation of the voluntary con-
tribution game does not satisfy i-group eciency for a set of participants, in particular
the set consisting of more than two participants. Saijo and Yamato (1999, 2010) show
that not all agents participate in the voluntary contribution to the public good and the
equilibrium allocation of the participation game is not i-Pareto ecient.
Their results are in contrast to ours. In the presence of the strong complementarity
modeled by the Leontief utility function, for each set of participants, the i-group-ecient
allocation is supported at a Nash equilibrium by Proposition 8 and the i-Pareto-ecient
allocation is attained at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the participation game by
Proposition 5. From the comparison, we can conclude that when the private good is not
transferable, the strong complementarity between the two goods provides such a strong
incentive to agents as to achieve the (i-)Pareto-ecient allocation at equilibria.
When the private good is transferable, the implication of our result is the same as that
of Saijo and Yamato (1999, 2010). As discussed in Section 4, the equilibrium allocation
is not s-Pareto ecient in the voluntary participation game without transfer, even in our
model. Strong complementarity cannot provide an incentive such that the equilibrium
allocation is (s-)Pareto ecient. In our model, there is the possibility that C(N; yN ) con-
sists of many agents. Then, many agents participate in the equilibrium. The participation
of many agents does not induce the (s-)Pareto eciency of the equilibrium allocation.
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6 Conclusion
This paper examines the participation behavior and the allocative eciency in the econ-
omy with a public good in the presence of the strong complementarity between the private
good and the public good. In our model, every agent has the same Leontief utility func-
tion with respect to the consumption of the private and the public goods. Agents can
dier in initial endowments of the private good and in production technology of the public
good. We rst nd that whether agents voluntarily participate in the public good provi-
sion depends solely on the initial endowment of the private good: the greater the initial
endowment of the private good that agents have, the more likely they are to participate
in the provision of the public good. Such a binary participation decision does not depend
on the eciency of the production technology held by agents. Second, we examine the
eciency of the equilibrium allocation of the voluntary participation game. We show that
while the equilibrium allocation is i-Pareto ecient, it is not necessarily s-Pareto ecient.
Third, we examine whether the voluntary transfer of the private good among agents can
achieve an s-Pareto-ecient allocation. We extend the voluntary participation game in
such a way that agents can freely exchange their endowments of the private good, based on
the model of Jackson and Wilkie (2005). We show that at the equilibrium in this model,
the voluntary transfer scheme does not always achieve s-Pareto eciency. The reason
that the transfer scheme does not work is that the Pareto-improving transfer is always
possible, but in some cases, it is dicult to provide agents with an incentive to execute
such a transfer scheme. In this case, an outside authority such as a government is needed
to compel a Pareto-improving transfer scheme.
Our result is new in the sense that we explain the incentive for the voluntary devel-
opment of OSS in terms of the amount of endowment/resources a developer can invest
in OSS. Our result can be partially justied by the empirical analysis by Bitzer and
Geishecker (2010). We hope that our results will provide a new perspective on the study
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of the voluntary development of OSS.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
(4.1) Consider a voluntary contribution game when P[fig is a set of participants. Suppose,
conversely, that yi;P[fig = 0. Then,
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig  wi. Consider the game in which
given yi;P[fig = 0, agents in P decide on their contributions, simultaneously. This is the
same situation as in the game when P is the set of participants. Thus, C(P [fig; yP[fig) =
C(P; yP ) and wi >
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig =
P
j2P y

j;P . This is a contradiction.
(4.2) Let us denote B  C(P [fig; yP[fig)\C(P; yP ), C  C(P; yP )nC(P [fig; yP[fig),
and D  C(P [ fig; yP[fig)nC(P; yP ). By Lemma 4, i 2 D; hence, D is not empty.
Claim 1 It follows that
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Proof of Claim 1. We rst show (11). Because yl;P[fig = 0 for each l 2 C, we have
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for each l 2 C. Summarizing this condition over l 2 C yields
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Thus, we have (11).
Second, we show (12). When P[fig is a set of participants, every l 2 D is a contributor;
hence
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Summarizing this condition over i 2 D, we have
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Hence, (12) holds. (End of Proof of Claim 1)
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Note that C(P; yP ) = B [ C and C(P [ fig; yP[fig) = B [ D. Thus
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By (12), we nd that the left-hand-side value is larger than the right-hand-side one. That
is, we have () > 0. Thus,
P
k2P[fig y

k;P[fig >
P
k2P y

k;P . 
(4.3) By (4.1), C(P [ fig; yP[fig) \C(P; yP ) [ fig  C(P [ fig; yP[fig). We show the
converse. Let j 2 C(P [fig; yP[fig). If j = i, then j 2 C(P [fig; yP[fig)\C(P; yP )[fig,
trivially. We need to show that if j 6= i, then j 2 C(P; yP ). Suppose, conversely, that
j =2 C(P; yP ). Then, because j 2 C(P [ fig; yP[fig)nC(P; yP )
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which contradicts (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 5.
We show the contrapositive. Let P ( N and i 2 NnP . Suppose that i 2 C(P [fig; yP[fig)
or C(P [ fig; yP[fig) 6= C(P; yP ). Suppose rst that i =2 C(P [ fig; yP[fig) and C(P [
fig; yP[fig) 6= C(P; yP ). Because i =2 C(P[fig; yP[fig), then yi;P[fig = 0. Given yi;P[fig =
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0, if agents in P simultaneously choose their contributions, then they choose yj;P for all
j 2 P . Therefore, we must have C(P [ fig; yP[fig) = C(P; yP ), which is a contradiction.
Such a case never occurs. Second, suppose that i 2 C(P [ fig; yP[fig). By (4), if i 2
C(P [ fig; yP[fig), then
yi;P[fig =
1
pi(1 +
P
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0@wi
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By (iii) of Lemma 1,
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig = (1+
P
j2C(P;yP )nfig(1=pj))=
P
j2C(P;yP )nfig(wj=pj).
Thus, wi >
P
j2P[fig y

j;P[fig.
Proof of Proposition 4
For preparation of proof of Proposition 4, we show the following claim.
Claim 2 Sets N and C(N; yN ) are Nash equilibrium sets of participants in the voluntary
participation game.
Proof of Claim 2. We rst show that N is a Nash equilibrium set of participants. Sup-
pose that wi 
P
j2Nnfig y

j;Nnfig for some i 2 C(N; yN ). Then, by Lemma 5, i =2 C(N; yN ).
Thus, wi >
P
j2Nnfig y

j;Nnfig for each i 2 C(N; yN ). By Proposition 3, N is supported at a
Nash equilibrium. Next, we show that C(N; yN ) is a Nash equilibrium set of participants.
By Lemma 5, wi >
P
j2C(N;yN )nfig y

j;C(N;yN )nfig for each i 2 C(C(N; y

N ); y

C(N;yN )
).8 By
Lemma 3, wk 
P
j2N y

j;N =
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
for each k 2 NnC(N; yN ). By Propo-
sition 3, C(N; yN ) is supported at a Nash equilibrium. (End of Proof of Claim 2)
(suciency) By Lemma 5, wi >
P
j2Pnfig y

j;Pnfig for each i 2 C(P; yP ). Before proving
that P satises (ii') in Proposition 3, we show that C(N; yN ) = C(P; y

P ). We show this
by applying Lemma 5 iteratively to each agent in PnC(N; yN ). Denote PnC(N; yN ) 
fk1; : : : ; kmg such that m  1.9 Because C(N; yN )  P  N , then PnC(N; yN ) 
8Trivially, C(C(N; yN ); y

C(N;y
N
)) = C(N; y

N ).
9If PnC(N; yN ) is empty, C(N; yN ) = C(P; yP ) trivially holds.
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NnC(N; yN ). Because by Claim 2, C(N; yN ) is supported at a Nash equilibrium, then
wj 
X
j2C(N;yN )
yj;C(N;yN ) for each j 2 NnC(N; y

N ). (14)
Hence, in particular, wj 
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
for each j 2 PnC(N; yN ). First, we
apply Lemma 5 to k1. Note that C(C(N; y

N ); y

C(N;yN )
) = C(N; yN ). Because wk1 P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
, then by Lemma 5, k1 =2 C(C(N; yN ) [ fk1g; yC(N;yN )[fk1g) and
C(N; yN ) = C(C(N; y

N ); y

C(N;yN )
) = C(C(N; yN ) [ fk1g; yC(N;yN )[fk1g). ThusX
j2C(N;yN )
yj;C(N;yN ) =
X
j2C(N;yN )[fk1g
yj;C(N;yN )[fk1g: (15)
Second, we apply Lemma 5 to k2. By (15)
wk2 
X
j2C(N;yN )
yj;C(N;yN ) =
X
j2C(N;yN )[fk1g
yj;C(N;yN )[fk1g:
Thus, by Lemma 5
C(C(N; yN ) [ fk1g; yC(N;yN )[fk1g) = C(C(N; y

N ) [ fk1; k2g; yC(N;yN )[fk1;k2g):
By the iterative application of Lemma 5 to k3; : : : ; km, we have
C(N; yN ) = C(C(N; y

N ) [ fk1g; yC(N;yN )[fk1g) = C(C(N; y

N ) [ fk1; k2g; yC(N;yN )[fk1;k2g)
=    = C(Pnfkmg; yPnfkmg) = C(P; yP ): (16)
By (16) and Lemma 3
X
j2C(N;yN )
yj;C(N;yN ) =
X
j2C(P;y)
yj;C(P;yP ) =
X
j2P
yj;P : (17)
Conditions (14) and (17) andNnP  NnC(N; yN ) imply that wj 
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
=P
j2P y

j;P for each j 2 NnP , which is (ii').
(necessity) It is trivial that P  N . We show that each Nash equilibrium set of
participants P satises C(N; yN )  P . Suppose, conversely, that there exists a Nash
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equilibrium set of participants P that does not satisfy it. Then, there is i 2 C(N; yN )nP ,
which implies
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
=
P
j2N y

j;N < wi 
P
j2P y

j;P by Lemma 3. When
N = P , this inequality does not hold. We need to consider the case where P 6= N .
Because P is supported at a Nash equilibrium, then
P
j2P y

j;P  wk for each k 2 NnP .
Applying Lemma 5 to each agent in NnP iteratively in a similar way to the above, we have
C(P; yP ) = C(P[fjg; yP[fjg) =    = C(Nnflg; yNnflg) = C(N; yN ), where j; l 2 NnP .By
Lemma 3,
P
j2N y

j =
P
j2C(N;yN ) y

j;C(N;yN )
=
P
j2C(P;yP ) y

j;C(P;yP )
=
P
j2P y

j;P , which
is a contradiction.
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